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Configuring the Networked Citizen 
Julie E. Cohen 
 
Among legal scholars of technology, it has become commonplace to acknowledge that 
the design of networked information technologies has regulatory effects. For the most 
part, that discussion has been structured by the taxonomy developed by Lawrence Lessig, 
which classifies ―code‖ as one of four principal regulatory modalities, alongside law, 
markets, and norms.
1
 As a result of that framing, questions about the applicability of 
constitutional protections to technical decisions have taken center stage in legal and 
policy debates. Some scholars have pondered whether digital architectures unacceptably 
constrain fundamental liberties, and what ―public‖ design obligations might follow from 
such a conclusion. Others have argued that code belongs firmly on the ―private‖ side of 
the public/private divide because it originates in the innovative activity of private actors. 
 In a forthcoming book, I argue that the project of situating code within one or another 
part of the familiar constitutional landscape too often distracts legal scholars from more 
important questions about the quality of the regulation that networked digital 
architectures produce.
2
 The gradual, inexorable embedding of networked information 
technologies has the potential to alter, in largely invisible ways, the interrelated processes 
of subject formation and culture formation. Within legal scholarship, the prevailing 
conceptions of subjectivity tend to be highly individualistic, oriented around the activities 
of speech and voluntary affiliation. Subjectivity also tends to be understood as 
definitionally independent of ―culture.‖ Yet subjectivity is importantly collective, formed 
by the substrate within which individuality emerges. People form their conceptions of the 
good in part by reading, listening, and watching—by engaging with the products of a 
common culture—and by interacting with one another. Those activities are socially and 
culturally mediated, shaped by the preexisting communities into which individuals are 
born and within which they develop. They are also technically mediated, shaped by the 
artifacts that individuals encounter in common use. 
 The social and cultural patterns that mediate the activities of self-constitution are 
being reconfigured by the pervasive adoption of technical protocols and services that 
manage the activities of content delivery, search, and social interaction. In developed 
countries, a broad cross-section of the population routinely uses networked information 
technologies and communications devices in hundreds of mundane, unremarkable ways. 
We search for information, communicate with each other, and gain access to networked 
resources and services. For the most part, as long as our devices and technologies work as 




expected, we give little thought to how they work; those questions are understood to be 
―technical‖ questions. Such questions are better characterized as sociotechnical. As 
networked digital architectures increasingly mediate the ordinary processes of everyday 
life, they catalyze gradual yet fundamental social and cultural change. 
 This chapter considers two interrelated questions that flow from understanding 
sociotechnical change as (re)configuring networked subjects. First, it revisits the way that 
legal and policy debates locate networked information technologies with respect to the 
public/private divide. The design of networked information technologies and 
communications devices is conventionally treated as a private matter; indeed, that 
designation has been the principal stumbling block encountered by constitutional 
theorists of technology. The classification of ―code‖ as presumptively private has effects 
that reach beyond debates about the scope of constitutional guarantees, shaping views 
about the extent to which regulation of technical design decisions is normatively 
desirable. This chapter reexamines that discursive process, using lenses supplied by 
literatures on third-party liability and governance. Second, this chapter considers the 
relationship between sociotechnical change and understandings of citizenship. The ways 
that people think, form beliefs, and interact with one another are centrally relevant to the 
sorts of citizens that they become. The gradual embedding of networked information 
technologies into the practice of everyday life therefore has important implications for 
both the meaning and the practice of citizenship in the emerging networked information 
society. If design decisions are neither ―merely‖ technical nor presumptively private, then 
they should be subject to more careful scrutiny with regard to the kind of citizen they 
produce. In particular, policy-makers cannot avoid engaging with the particular values 
that are encoded. 
 
Configuration 
 Scholars in the umbrella field known as science and technology studies (―STS‖) have 
observed that although people design artifacts, artifacts also configure their users. 
Processes of configuration operate on several levels. First, designers of artifacts work 
with particular models of the user in mind, and those models have both intended and 
unintended effects.
3
 Second, and more comprehensively, the artifacts that we use in our 
daily lives mediate our behavioral, perceptual, and heuristic relationships to the world 
around us. The particularities of their design make some actions seem easier and more 
natural, and other activities more difficult. These implicit behavioral templates, or 
affordances, encourage us to behave in certain ways rather than others.
4
 Less remarked 
but often equally important, we tend to naturalize the operation of our artifacts—to 
experience the artifacts themselves as part of natural reality, and to perceive natural and 
social worlds through the lenses that they create.
5
 
 The processes of mediation and naturalization are old. In one sense, networked 
information technologies simply continue a process that has existed as long as humans 
have used tools. A mundane example of a predigital artifact that mediates our interaction 




with the world, familiar to many lawyers from the disability rights context, is the 
doorknob. A door with a doorknob is easier for some people to open than for others, and 
the difference profoundly shapes people’s experience of the world around them. A world 
in which buildings and rooms are accessed via doors with doorknobs is trivially 
accessible for able-bodied adults and very nearly inaccessible for small children and 
those with certain disabilities. In the case of very small children, barriers to accessibility 
are usually a good thing; in the case of the disabled, however, barriers to accessibility 
have impeded equal participation in social and economic life. 
 Networked information technologies intensify the processes of mediation and 
naturalization. Consider now a more complicated example involving techniques of 
mapping and geolocation.
6
 Twenty years ago, if one wanted to drive from one’s own 
home to visit a friend in another town, one needed a map. Maps could (and still can) be 
purchased at bookstores and tourism offices or obtained from automobile clubs. To get 
from point A to point B, one studied the map, figured out the ―lay of the land,‖ and 
plotted a route. Internet mapping technologies changed that process; beginning about a 
decade ago, the Internet-savvy could use Mapquest or Google to plot their routes. When 
online route-plotting becomes the norm, it is possible to get from point A to point B 
without needing to figure out the route, or to take the ―lay of the land,‖ for oneself. One 
may, however, still have a general sense of the route to the extent that the printout shows 
a complete journey and provides some contextual details, such as major landmarks and 
whether travel will occur on highways or surface roads. Sometimes, online mapping 
services offer a choice of routes, which one can make using the contextual details that are 
available. Portable GPS technologies change the process of getting from point A to point 
B yet again. Now, one need not ever examine the proposed route in its entirety. One 
simply follows directions as they are given, one at a time. And one need not take the ―lay 
of the land‖ at all. 
 As this example suggests, the mediation that networked information technologies 
perform is more complex in two interrelated ways. First, these technologies do not 
merely reshape the way we manipulate the world. They also represent the world, which 
creates the potential for more significant changes in the way that we make sense of it. 
They supply ready-to-hand representations that can free us from the need to create our 
own. 
 Second, networked information technologies do the work of mediation in a way that 
is more invisible to the ordinary user. In part this characteristic flows from the relative 
complexity of digital technologies and artifacts, but it also flows from prevailing norms 
of good design, which emphasize seamless, ―user-friendly‖ interfaces that conceal the 
representational and heuristic work being done. Rules normalizing certain functions (for 
example, the plotting and display of travel routes, or the collection of information about 
users of a travel mapping service) can be distributed among technical intermediaries and 
embedded in the network, while users experience the effects of those rules as ―just the 
way things are.‖ 




 Consider now some other examples, directly related to processes of subject-formation 
and culture-formation, and by extension to the practice of citizenship: 
 Search: In the real world, access to information is mediated by a variety of physical 
and cultural factors, including geography and social convention. The technologies of 
online search and content delivery reshape existing patterns of accessibility. This is 
largely to the good; for those with access to the basic technical capability, networked 
information technologies and devices have dramatically increased access to information. 
Information networks do not simply negate barriers to access, however. Search engines 
like Google or Yahoo! rely on algorithms that read a variety of contextual clues about the 
relevance and appeal of particular items. Those algorithms in turn establish new 
geographies of access defined by a variety of factors, including semantic relatedness, 
popularity, and commercial interest. 
 In addition to providing and prioritizing different types of information, the online 
geographies of search and retrieval differ from physical geographies in other important 
ways. In particular, the rules that govern access can be more difficult to discern. Search 
engines configure us to expect every conceivable kind of information readily displayed at 
our fingertips. The rules that govern access seem to be neutral and natural, if we bother to 
interrogate them at all. Displays that segregate ―real‖ results from sponsored ads add to 
the aura of neutral authority. In fact, the contents of search results are determined in part 
by users’ own profiles and browsing histories; they are not neutral or natural in the least. 
More precise information about how search algorithms works generally is not available, 
however, because the search algorithms used by for-profit search companies are held as 
trade secrets. 
 The reconfiguration of search and accessibility reshapes the processes by which 
individuals and communities discover and make sense of information about the world. 
Early Internet scholars predicted that networked information technologies would produce 
an information environment characterized by greater openness and reduced censorship, 
but those predictions are not always borne out. Most obviously, some governments 
employ filtering technologies to restrict their citizens’ access to information. Even in 
countries without a national firewall policy, however, coalescence around political 
affinity can produce a balkanizing effect. For example, recent examinations of the U.S. 
―Tea Party‖ movement suggest that ―on the Internet‖ it is possible to exist in the echo 
chamber of one’s own choosing, reading only sources that reinforce one’s initial beliefs.7 
Other effects of reconfiguration are more general and subtle. By ―personalizing‖ search 
and retrieval, the new semantic web technologies alter the nature of the serendipity that 
attends the activities of searching and browsing in ways that we have barely begun to 
understand. 
 Content Delivery: In the realm of content delivery, we have been accustomed to 
different kinds of access for different works—for example, bookstores for current or 
popular books and libraries for older or rarer books; record stores for the music we want 
to own and the radio for a more ephemeral listening experience; and so on. Online 
ventures blur the boundaries between distribution channels—between the library and the 




bookstore, between the record store and the radio, between the movie theater, the 
television, and the telephone. They also blur the boundaries between modes of access, 
including most notably copyright law’s traditional distinction between the distribution of 
copies and one-time performance. 
 The processes of digital convergence have been described, and rightly so, as 
dramatically expanding the accessibility of knowledge goods. Again, however, 
networked information technologies do not simply increase access but also reconfigure it. 
For example, as online services become preferred routes for locating textual materials, 
the technologies for accessing information in book and periodical form are merging with 
the logics of commercialized search. In libraries, serendipitous encounters with 
knowledge traditionally have flowed from the physical process of browsing in the stacks 
or flipping through journal issues. For the most part, digital libraries have not yet 
effectively translated that capability to the digital realm. Digital cataloguing systems are 
cumbersome and hierarchically organized; they don’t invite unstructured browsing the 
way real libraries do. Digital bookstores, in contrast, are innovators in search and 
recommendation, offering kinds of serendipity that users have learned to value 
enormously. But the serendipity that digital bookstores offer is different; it is based on 
commercially driven processes of personalization and prediction. The Google Book 
Search project takes that process to the next level, applying algorithm-driven 
personalization to full-text search. 
 Meanwhile, emerging technologies for delivery of digital media content increasingly 
incorporate protocols that restrict access to compliant (that is, authorized) devices. 
Designers of these technologies seek to reconfigure users’ expectations about the 
content’s manipulability—its amenability to being copied and remixed. In the case of 
digital music, users have resisted this reconfiguration because it radically altered 
capabilities they had come to expect. In the case of DVD movies and digital television 
standards, as to which users had fewer prior expectations, there was less resistance to 
overcome, and most users have more readily acquiesced to coded-in restrictions.
8
 
Conventions for delivery of text-based content ranging from news and opinion pieces to 
journal articles to books are still evolving. 
 Interaction: For many people, the modalities of social interaction have been 
dramatically altered by the emergence of ―Web 2.0‖ technologies such as social 
networking services and content-sharing platforms. Just as physical architectures shape 
the terms of interaction in ―real space,‖ so the terms of online interaction are modulated 
by the features of digital architectures. If one subscribes to Facebook, for example, or 
uploads videos to YouTube, information is revealed or concealed, and connections made 
or refused, according to the options that each platform makes available. 
 Social networking platforms like Facebook configure their users to expect a relatively 
flat and large-grained universe of privacy possibilities. With very few tools for making 
fine-grained distinctions about the contextual appropriateness of particular disclosures, 
users who wish to take advantage of these platforms’ connectivity must decide whether to 
disclose a large amount of information to most of their contacts or to disclose that 




information only to a select few. They also must learn to classify family, friends, and 
acquaintances according to a rigid and context-insensitive system that recognizes only a 
few categories. 
 The conventions instantiated by social networking platforms also alter the public 
discourse about secrecy and privacy. That result flows in part from social networking 
providers’ complex and intertwined relationships with other commercial entities. Users’ 
tastes and networks of contacts are valuable assets, and social networking platforms that 
seek to establish their own commercial viability can do so by selling access to their users. 
In addition, the large-grained and context-insensitive rules that mediate online disclosures 
create a climate in which embarrassing overdisclosures are inevitable and occur regularly, 
and in which users in turn become more highly attuned to disclosure-induced titillation 
and scandal. 
 In each of the areas described, networked information technologies and associated 
business models are configuring their users to expect particular capabilities and effects—
to perceive a world mediated by the logics of search as unmediated reality, to experience 
the copying and remixing of cultural products as posing large legal risks, and to expect 
widespread disclosure and repeated scandal and spectacle in the domain of the personal. 
Those processes of configuration have potentially large consequences for the ways in 
which users gather information about the world, interact with their communities, form 
their own opinions of the good life, and define and pursue common goals. 
 In none of these cases are the changes just described the result of ―technology‖ pure 
and simple. Technologies and artifacts do not have fixed, inevitable trajectories. In one of 
the foundational texts of STS, Langdon Winner posed the question whether particular 
classes of artifacts might nonetheless be said to have a definite politics.
9
 He suggested 
that some technologies might be especially compatible with authoritarian or bureaucratic 
social forms—for example, nuclear warhead technology requires an authoritarian 
command structure. On that account, however, the technical and the social are even more 
tightly intertwined for ―political‖ technologies than they are for ―ordinary‖ ones. In either 
case, artifacts assume configurations that are determined by socially embedded values 
and priorities. Those configurations are an appropriate and important domain for law- and 
policy-making. 
 
Configuration and Responsibility for Harm 
 To what extent should designers of networked digital artifacts bear legal 
responsibility for the ways that their design choices configure users? Legal scholars have 
long debated the extent to which legal responsibility for harms should be placed on third 
parties. In debates that range across topics from products liability to gun control to online 
copyright infringement, the arguments take on a predictable rhythm, in which theories 
about efficient prevention of harm clash with more libertarian takes on causation and 
responsibility. Defined by the liberty/efficiency binary, debates about responsibility tend 
to become zero-sum games, in which defendants are either fully responsible or fully 




immune from liability. That framing encourages judges and legal commentators to ignore 
more complicated questions about the institutional distribution of power—or, sometimes, 
to reason that a problem’s complexity justifies declining to assign responsibility to any 
particular actor. The resulting inaction tends to reinforce the existing distribution of 
power rather than countering it. 
 In the arena of copyright policy, intermediary liability for online copyright 
infringement has been hotly contested. Scholars concerned with the preservation of 
individual liberties online have argued that placing responsibility for copyright 
infringement on providers of networked information technologies and communications 
services is unjust because those technologies and services are capable of a range of lawful 
uses. They argue that indirect liability doctrines are likely to result in the curtailment of 
long-cherished communicative freedoms, and to stifle productive innovation. On that 
reasoning, technology providers also should have no duty to modify their offerings to 
make third-party infringement more difficult. 
 Economic analysis, meanwhile, seems to point the other way; if liability for particular 
conduct is otherwise desirable, it should be allocated to the party or parties that can avoid 
harm for the lowest cost. On this reasoning, technology providers may legitimately be 
subjected to (re)design duties, even at some potential cost to user freedom. For now, at 
least, this view of the efficiency calculus appears to have gained the upper hand. 
Although indirect liability doctrines stop short of imposing specific design duties on 
providers of digital equipment and services, and so purport to balance freedom with 
obligation, the contours of liability are sufficiently uncertain to induce risk-averse firms 
to err on the side of caution. 
 Participants in these debates about responsibility for online copyright harms often 
seem tone-deaf to the broader effects of institutional and discursive power. The rules 
broadly distributing responsibility for infringement are cohering in predictable patterns 
that serve powerful and well-established interests. In particular, many emerging protocols 
for digital media devices and transmissions represent attempts to establish closed 
―regimes of authorization‖ that admit only compliant intermediaries.10 Critically, such 
regimes encourage overpolicing by technology intermediaries in ways that disserve user 
interests in the freedom to engage in unstructured, open-ended interactions with cultural 
artifacts. This in turn undermines other important collective values that relate to cultural 
progress and to the quality of public discourse. Yet the extreme libertarian approach to 
technical design is equally untenable. On that view technology providers have no 
responsibility whatsoever for avoiding large harms either to legally sanctioned ownership 
interests or to the quality of public discourse more generally. And the polarization of 
copyright discourse proceeds at the expense of a productive middle ground that would 
involve defining the obligations of technology intermediaries more carefully. 
 In the privacy context, the polarities are reversed. Regulatory focus on the least cost 
avoider is either absent or sharply reduced, even though large processors of personal 
information are in the best position to prevent or minimize the risks of many privacy 
harms. Instead, most transfers of personal information in the United States are essentially 




unregulated. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has exercised oversight of privacy 
practices according to a notice-and-consent model, under which a firm processing 
personal information simply must disclose its privacy policy and honor the terms. In 
contexts where greater regulatory coordination is necessary, the FTC has shown a marked 
preference for so-called self-regulation by industry groups. 
 Civil libertarian arguments about privacy, meanwhile, do not uniformly support high 
privacy protection. Many such arguments privilege freedom of choice, including choices 
to surrender personal information in ways that may commodify the self. The FTC’s 
regulatory stance likewise rests on the implicit judgment that individual transfers of 
personal information are generally consensual. Other libertarian arguments against 
privacy assert that state support for secrecy in any form undermines foundational 
principles of freedom of expression. Such arguments are not simply ―constitutional‖ but 
rather ideological in character; they interpret core constitutional guarantees in a way that 
furthers a political economy of ―communicative capitalism,‖ in which flows of 
information are the engine of both politics and profit.
11
 
 Like the copyright debate about control, the privacy debate is tone-deaf to the 
inequalities that the commitment to openness creates. The notice-and-consent model, 
which facially appears to privilege liberty, concentrates all of the costs of controlling 
disclosures of personal information on the affected individuals. The resulting patterns of 
information flow disrupt the dialectical processes of boundary management that 
constitute privacy in practice and that situated subjects require in order to thrive.
12
 The 
resulting ―surveillant assemblages‖ do not simply render personal information accessible, 
but rather seek to render individual behaviors and preferences transparent and malleable 
by conforming them to preexisting frameworks.
13
 It is true that no single commercial 
actor is responsible for ―causing‖ online privacy harms; those harms are caused, instead, 
by the collective decision to do nothing (or very little) to stem the flow of information. At 
the same time, surveillant assemblages are vehicles for the exercise of power. 
 A few legal scholars have criticized the liberty/efficiency binary that dominates 
debates about responsibility and accountability precisely because it avoids the problem of 
ethical responsibility toward others. In a memorable essay about the deaths of children 
from gun violence, Mari Matsuda argued that legal rules about causation should be 
revised to reflect an ethic of care for the powerless.
14
 Among other things, such a shift 
would entail distributing responsibility for harms suffered by disadvantaged persons 
broadly to powerful actors whose actions (or inactions) contributed to those harms. 
Matsuda’s argument reminds us that facially neutral rules allocating responsibility can 
conceal a set of important background questions about distributive justice and ethical 
accountability. 
 Particularly in the high technology context, however, arguments about distributive 
justice do not squarely come to grips with the problem of configuration.
15
 As we have 
seen, the current evolution of networked digital technologies is reconfiguring technology 
users to be passive consumers of media content and eager participants in the semantic 
web and the surveillance processes that feed it. That process raises questions not only 




about who should bear responsibility for harms but also about how that responsibility 
should be exercised. The choices involved are not the relatively simple choices that legal 
cases often present—for example, whether to reduce the probability of harm by x percent 
by adding a known safety measure that would increase a product’s cost by y percent. 
They are more complex questions about how a design process with many moving parts 
should prioritize particular values. Relatedly, there are also questions of technological 
path-dependency to consider. Information-based products have complex life cycles, as do 
databases of consumer personal information. Thus, for example, assigning responsibility 
for contribution to invasions of privacy after the fact may do much less to advance the 
individual interest in privacy than we like to think. 
 Like the distributive justice argument, the problems of complexity and path-
dependency force recognition of the fact that responsibility for information-based harms 
is not really binary at all. Participants in information markets already know this. For 
example, the gradual emergence of interlinked regimes of authorization in which many 
parties play roles in preventing the unauthorized spread of copyrighted content testifies to 
the fact that in the networked information age, responsibility for information flow is 
collective. As things now stand, however, the development of information law and policy 
for the networked information society does not seem to be proceeding in ways that 
comport with the ethic of care that Matsuda so powerfully articulates. 
 Perhaps, however, the problem is an institutional one. If courts cannot properly 
evaluate the distribution of responsibility, perhaps the problem is structural, and we might 
do better by placing that question in broader institutional perspective. Put differently, 
perhaps the distributive justice argument and the problem of configuration point to a type 
of responsibility that is more appropriately and effectively exercised elsewhere, in 
regulatory fora that might address the problem of configuration in a more systematic 
fashion. 
 
Configuration and Governance 
 Another way to approach the question of legal responsibility for the ongoing 
configuration of networked individuals and communities is to consider more generally 
how society ought to structure accountability for the design of networked information 
technologies and artifacts. Among U.S. scholars of technology law and policy, those 
questions too have conventional answers. Many scholars who write about law and 
technology issues tend to think that the development of technical standards and the 
evolution of digital products and services are matters best regulated by the market rather 
than by government. Effective technology policy thus is a matter of respectful tinkering 
at the edge of essentially private processes. 
 It is tempting to read claims about the regulatory primacy of markets as restating a 
view of the public/private distinction that has long been discredited, and that regards 
certain types of activities as definitionally private.
16
 Yet that formal view of the 
public/private distinction does not seem to be quite what contemporary legal scholars 




mean when they tout the superiority of market processes. Parsed more carefully, such 
claims reflect a more general shift in the tenor of scholarly conversations about the 
origins of effective ―governance.‖ Descriptive accounts of regulation everywhere around 
us—in markets, in norms, and in ―code‖—are increasingly conjoined with normative 
claims about the relative efficacy of privatized regulation through cooperative standard-
setting, licensing of compliant implementations, joint ventures, and other collaborative 
activities by market participants. In these arguments, the incoherence of the 
public/private distinction is beside the point, and may even facilitate the movement of 
regulatory functions across the (problematized and possibly nonexistent) public/private 
divide. 
 The neorealist view of the process of governance held by many legal scholars of 
technology remains complicated in fundamental ways by liberal ideologies about the 
superiority of market processes. For example, a pillar of the neorealist faith in regulation-
by-markets is a presumption about the market’s relative speed and agility. But claims 
about the speed and agility of market processes tend not to account for technical and 
contractual path-dependencies. Collaboration in technology markets installs 
constellations of interests and commitments that span many generations of products and 
can be difficult to dislodge. This dynamic also calls into question the related presumption 
about the market’s superiority as evaluator of technical merit; market participants tend to 
have their own precommitments and loyalties. Finally, government plays an important 
role in validating private technology processes, and not only because legal rules 
determine the ―public‖ and ―private‖ labels. Government actors are customers for 
technology products and services, and also are interested in advancing policy agendas of 
their own. 
 The technologies discussed above illustrate these complexities in operation. Although 
technical standards for protecting digital content and authorizing compliant 
implementations generally are developed via private standard-making processes, that 
process has been cumbersome and path-dependent. It also has entailed significant 
government involvement and support; for example, the FCC’s rulemakings on the cable 
plug-and-play standard comprehensively involve the agency in standard-setting for 
access to digital broadcast content. So too with legal ―standards‖: under the proposed 
Google Book Search settlement, the availability of books for online search would be 
regulated by privately negotiated and administered procedures, yet those procedures 
would bear the imprimatur of law and would bind a class of current and future claimants 
certified by the court. Notice-and-consent based regimes of privacy regulation, which 
represent an extreme devolution of regulatory authority upon private actors, generate 
path-dependencies that are inscribed in the design of information systems for storing, 
processing, and transferring user personal information. Still other examples discussed 
above are not thought to involve ―regulation‖ at all; search engine algorithms, for 
example, tend to be understood as purely market creations, and on that understanding, the 
market also functions as ideological corrective to bias problems. That reasoning, 
however, is open to serious question for reasons that reveal the inextricable involvement 




of law. Search algorithms are objects of property, protected by trade secrecy laws from 
the sorts of disclosures that would enable markets to evaluate them. Notice-and-consent 
regimes of privacy protection similarly lack operational transparency, in large part 
because regulators have elected not to take a position on the granularity of disclosures 
regarding secondary market uses. 
 These examples raise serious questions about the philosophy of governance embodied 
in the four-modalities taxonomy—a philosophy whose libertarian core coexists uneasily 
with a willingness to abdicate effective control over decisions affecting an increasingly 
wide swath of sociotechnical activity. The word ―governance‖ is supposed to denote a 
new methodological sophistication—a recognition that we have moved beyond 
government—but the four-modalities taxonomy does not incorporate considerations that 
political theorists consider critical, such as patterns of institutional interest and alignment. 
As some scholars have observed, contemporary models of ―governance‖ bear a passing 
resemblance to Foucault’s conception of ―governmentality,‖ in that they are premised on 
recognition of the pervasive diffusion of regulatory power throughout social institutions 
and discourses. At the same time, however, the enthusiastic embrace of privatized 
governance diverges from the Foucauldian approach to governmentality, which is 
concerned with mapping the distribution of power and subjecting it to critical scrutiny.
17
 
In operation, the four-modalities taxonomy of governance seeks simply to identify the 
most effective modalities of regulatory control, often in a relatively uncritical and 
technocratic fashion. For that reason, it is poorly suited to give regulators the critical 
purchase on the power imbalances that I identified in the previous section. 
 Determining the appropriate response to the de facto privatization of regulation by 
―code‖ is quite another matter. One might resort to the constitutional lawyer’s time-tested 
strategy of asserting the essentially ―public‖ nature of nominally private processes. Some 
scholars have made this argument in particular cases; for example, Danielle Citron argues 
that private-sector provision of electronic voting technologies should trigger due process 
guarantees.
18
 At the same time, it is clear that federal agencies are not equipped to engage 
in technical standard-making for the multitude of products and services that the 
networked citizen now confronts. Reclassifying the private as public therefore seems 
unlikely to lead to a workable solution. 
 According to Jody Freeman, such reclassification also misses the most important 
lesson that the deconstruction of the public/private distinction teaches us: attempting to 
counter the drift toward privatized governance by reasserting a (problematized and 
possibly nonexistent) conception of the disinterested public good will not work.
19
 Instead, 
she argues, we should embrace the public role in privatized governance by 
reconceptualizing governance through the lens of contract, as an extended process of 
public/private negotiation. 
 Freeman’s proposal for reconfiguring the public-private regulatory relationship 
suggests some fruitful avenues to explore in the context of networked information 
technologies. In particular, it suggests that we ought to approach problems of regulatory 
design without precommitments to the superiority of ―public‖ regulatory tools and 




processes. The traditional tools of government are neither the only nor the most useful 
tools for pursuing the implementation of public values. 
 Yet there is a mismatch of sorts between the model and the more accurate 
understanding of sociotechnical processes supplied by the STS literature. Freeman’s 
model seems to presume a regulatory playing field in which the state of the technological 
art is held constant, and in which ―technical‖ and ―governance‖ issues are distinct. As we 
have seen, however, processes of contestation over the course of technological 
development go to the core of how the technologies are implemented. Government need 
not sit on the sidelines during that process, but instead can play a role in shaping 
governance processes in ways that distribute responsibility appropriately. 
 This argument derives unexpected theoretical support from the domain of economics. 
Economic theory identifies certain ―public goods‖ that will not be produced absent state 
intervention, whether in the form of provision (national defense), subsidies (basic 
scientific research), or incentives (intellectual property). The emerging subdiscipline of 
public goods economics extends this core insight about potential underproduction to 
other classes of goods that generate large positive externalities, such as education, and 
argues that government ought to be responsible for ensuring sufficient production of 
those goods even if (and indeed precisely because) such provision entails ―interference‖ 
in markets.
20
 Like education, privacy and cultural play generate large positive spillovers 
for society; it is therefore incumbent upon society to ensure that they are produced in 
sufficient quantities. 
 The complexities of technological development suggest two important roles for 
public regulatory authorities. First, public regulators have an important role to play in 
designating particular values to serve as focal points for private standard-making. Such 
values might concern the scope of user ―breathing room‖ to interact with digital media, or 
might establish broadly defined substantive privacy obligations around which private 
implementations might cohere. A template for this process is supplied by the ―values in 
design‖ movement, whose practitioners articulate a design process organized around 
repeated definition, implementation, and iteration of critical and participatory values.
21
 
 Government also may demand accountability for the outcomes of private regulatory 
processes, and can tie that demand to particular metrics of success. For example, 
scholarship documenting and analyzing efforts to appropriate economic indicators as a 
technique for measuring the provision of human rights suggests that such ―technologies 
of governmentality,‖ although not without risks of their own, may help policy-makers to 
assess whether compliance with international obligations has been realized as a practical 
matter.
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 Critically, the metrics for accountability need not be the same as those used, for 
example, in measuring aggregate national welfare; they can be tailored to reflect 
distributions of income, education, access to communications and information, and 
cultural opportunity. 
 This general template for public/private cooperation leaves open the question of the 
particular values that the process should implement. That question brings us, finally, to 




the issue of citizenship. If networked information technologies mediate the practice of 
citizenship, the values articulated to serve as guideposts for the design process should 
connect to a larger vision of citizenship. This in turn suggests that law- and policy-
makers have a more general, conceptual role to play in the design of ―code.‖ 
 
Configuration and Citizenship 
 Theories of citizenship provide an alternative framework for structuring debates about 
accountability for the configuration of network users. To the extent that choices about the 
values encoded in technical architectures implicate the shaping of subjectivity and 
culture, they necessarily implicate the practice of citizenship by networked, situated 
subjects. In general, the leading theoretical approaches to citizenship are highly attuned to 
questions about how the structure of information markets affects the practice of 
citizenship. However, liberal and neoliberal theories of citizenship tend to be relatively 
insensitive to questions of sociotechnical configuration. Theories of sociotechnical 
configuration, for their part, tend to be relatively insensitive to the question of citizenship 
and how it is to be exercised. To some extent the divide traces back to first principles; 
theories of citizenship often (though not always) have close ties to liberal political theory, 
while theories of sociotechnical configuration tend to be aligned with critical theory. As 
the dependence of individuals, communities, markets, and governments on networked 
information technologies intensifies, the need for some rapprochement between the two 
literatures and their respective concerns has become more pressing. Emerging critical-
pragmatist theories of technology, and of citizenship, offer a way forward for thinking 
about the relation between technology and citizenship in the networked information age. 
 The liberty/efficiency binary that dominates debates about responsibility for 
copyright infringement, and that appears to dictate a systemic lack of responsibility for 
technology-driven harms to privacy, is broadly consonant with a neoliberal philosophy of 
government in which citizens are defined through their autonomous choices as consumers 
of goods, services, and information. Within neoliberal theories of political economy, 
citizens exercise their voice principally as consumers, by voting for or against particular 
candidates, by purchasing or declining to purchase access to particular goods and 
services, and by using or refraining from use of particular technologies. 
 The neoliberal vision of government and citizenship also animates debates about the 
possible regulatory oversight of technical design processes. What Jodi Short describes as 
―the paranoid style in regulatory reform‖ is very much in evidence in the legal and policy 
literature about code and law.
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 The particular understanding of the relationship between 
public and private that animates regulatory debates about new digital technologies is one 
in which scholars and policy advocates are deeply concerned about the risks of state 
coercion and state bumbling, and relatively insensitive to other worries. 
 Liberal theories of citizenship recognize a more robust role for the citizen but differ 
on how the condition of active, informed citizenship is to be achieved. While some 
theorists presume a baseline level of autonomy and a correspondingly active agency, 




others argue that those presumptions are unrealistic in light of existing patterns of 
inequality. Matsuda’s concern for the distributive implications of causation rules 
resonates with a differentialist model of citizenship within which the least powerful 
require the law’s special protection. Within Matsuda’s vision, law fulfills its core mission 
only when it articulates and puts into practice an ethic of care for the least fortunate. 
 The gap between neoliberal and liberal theories of citizenship is well explored, and I 
will not belabor it here. This chapter is concerned with a different sort of gap: even 
differentialist defenses of liberal citizenship leave unaddressed important questions about 
the sociotechnical dimension of citizenship. In particular, two kinds of questions remain 
to be answered: what capabilities are necessary for the practice of citizenship in an 
increasingly networked information society, and whether the practice of citizenship in the 
emerging networked information society ought to be linked to any particular substantive 
vision of what citizenship entails. 
 The theory of capabilities for human flourishing supplies the beginnings of an answer 
to the first question. One might characterize capabilities theory as concerned with 
establishing the conditions for the practice of citizenship. Human flourishing 
encompasses a range of needs beginning with the most general and basic conditions for 
physical survival and well-being, but also including higher-order needs. As developed by 
Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen, and others, the theory points to the capabilities 
necessary for individuals and communities to form and pursue a vision of the good life.
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This necessarily implicates the practice of citizenship, and the connection is often 
explicit. Nussbaum’s taxonomy of essential capabilities includes the ability to exercise 




 As I have argued, however, translating the relatively abstract vision of capabilities for 
human flourishing into the networked information environment requires greater attention 
to the importance of both information and materiality. The literature generated by the 
―access to knowledge‖ (A2K) movement addresses some of these issues, pointing to the 
importance of access to information and networked information technologies in the 
emerging networked information society.
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 Yet both Nussbaum’s articulation of the 
capabilities approach and the version of the capabilities approach developed in the A2K 
literature are weak precisely on the issue of configuration. Nussbaum’s taxonomy of 
essential capabilities treats the material environment as either the subject of property or 
as inert matter. The approach developed in the A2K literature suffers from inattention to 
the material realities of everyday experience; this leads scholars affiliated with the A2K 
movement to overvalue ―openness‖ and to undervalue privacy. 
 A regime of information policy designed to promote human flourishing in the 
networked information society can address concerns about material enablement in two 
general ways.
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 First, technical architectures should be subject to a requirement of 
operational transparency. To exercise meaningful control over the development of critical 
subjectivity, the networked self needs adequate information about how the network and 
its constituent artifacts and protocols work and access to the processes in which network 




standards are designed. Second, information law and policy should seek to foster 
semantic discontinuity within technical and information landscapes. The emerging 
networked information society is characterized by increasingly seamless and granular 
regulation of information access and use, and by increasingly precise efforts to monitor 
and predict individual behavior with comparable seamlessness and granularity. This 
diminishes the ability of individual users and communities to encounter and interact with 
flows of culture, and to pursue contextually specific practices of self-definition, in 
patterns that form and re-form more organically. Information law and policy should 
foster interruptions in the legal, market, and technical frameworks that define information 
rights and obligations, to preserve room for such practices and patterns. 
 The second question, about the need for a substantive vision of citizenship to animate 
regulatory reform, directs our attention to the ways in which emerging sociotechnical 
configurations enable or disable not only particular capabilities, but also particular 
understandings of what ―citizenship‖ entails. One possibility is that the design of ―code‖ 
might prize a more explicitly nationalist vision in which ―imagined communities‖ 
articulate themselves in part through technical architectures and rules.
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 Internet 
technology and policy elites purport to reject such a vision, arguing that the Internet 
hastens convergence around universal values of openness. The values of most Internet 
elites are not neutral, however; they are Western and often American values. As Laura 
DeNardis shows, this demographic bias has given Internet standards proceedings a 
pronounced American slant.
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 As a practical reality, moreover, information policy is not 
made only in global standards processes, and information policy debates are peppered 
with national differences. Consider, for example, debates about the sale of Nazi 
memorabilia on eBay, which have raised questions about whose vision of free speech 
online ought to dominate. As another example, the European stance on information 
privacy is much different than that of the United States. 
 In Nussbaum’s articulation, the theory of capabilities for human flourishing is 
explicitly linked to a postnationalist, or cosmopolitan, vision of how citizenship is to be 
achieved.
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 Although it rejects instrumental assertions of national difference, the 
cosmopolitan vision of citizenship also cannot avoid being culturally determined; it is a 
Western vision that traces its origin to particular liberal values. Yet it strives for a relative 
universality that rejects social contractarian justifications for nationalist policies. Whether 
that view translates into particular prescriptions for the design of technology beyond a 
commitment to open source and open access is a question that A2K theorists generally 
have not considered. 
 How are we to choose between these approaches? It is worth noting, first, that 
arguments for nation-specific technology policy are not always or inevitably linked to 
nationalist theories of citizenship. In the realm of privacy, for example, European 
regulators believe that their approach better serves universal requirements of human 
dignity, and would prefer to see it adopted everywhere. To the extent that technology 
policy debates are rooted in more fundamental disagreements about nationalism versus 
cosmopolitanism (as seems to be the case, for example, in the controversy over Chinese 




Internet policy), there does not seem to be a principled way to decide. If we attend instead 
to the problem of sociotechnical configuration and to the linked problematic of subject-
formation, moreover, the question of nationalism versus cosmopolitanism seems 
imprecisely focused. National and cultural differences in technology policy are to some 
extent inevitable. It becomes relatively more important to pay attention to the processes 
by which power relations are encoded in technologies and artifacts. This is something 
that liberal theories of citizenship do not generally do. 
 Theories of sociotechnical configuration, in contrast, typically regard the foundational 
commitments of liberal political theory with suspicion, and instead manifest allegiance to 
some version of critical or radical political theory. Although there are important 
differences among theorists of technology, their primary concern is with the hidden 
exercise of power.
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 Yet with hidden power everywhere around us, the way forward for a 
theory of citizenship can be difficult to discern. 
 Contemporary work at the intersection between pragmatist theories of citizenship and 
critical theory offers a promising approach to integrating theories of sociotechnical 
configuration with theories of citizenship. The critical-pragmatist theories recently 
outlined by several scholars, including Larry Hickman and Alison Kadlec, supply a 
normative grounding for an approach to both citizenship and sociotechnical configuration 
that is both rigorous and antifoundationalist.
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 Both scholars draw on the writings of John 
Dewey, and argue that Dewey’s political theory is neither normatively anemic (as liberal 
theorists and communitarian theorists have asserted) nor indifferent to power (as critical 
theorists would have it), but rather supplies the foundation for an ethical approach to both 
politics and technology in an age of uncertainty. According to Hickman and Kadlec, the 
essence of democratic citizenship is not a particular position of normative privilege, and 
indeed no such position is epistemologically possible. Instead, the essence of democratic 
citizenship is a critical stance toward existing alignments of power and an openness 
toward revising one’s understanding of reality through experience and change. This 
stance in turn dictates a critical interventionist approach to technical architectures. 
 A critical-pragmatist approach to the practice of citizenship in the emerging 
networked information society sheds some useful, albeit preliminary, light on the 
question about nationalism versus universalism. What is troubling is not nationalist or 
universalist technology policy per se, but invisible processes of configuration deployed to 
buttress particular nationalist or universalist policies. Technical and sociotechnical 
opacity obscure the connections between configuration and the practice of citizenship, 
disabling both citizens and nations from self-determination. In an age in which human 
interactions are comprehensively mediated by networked information technologies, a 
universalist stance toward ensuring that technical architectures are transparent and open 
to revision is essential. 
 In particular, a critical-pragmatist approach to the practice of citizenship in the 
emerging networked information society suggests two kinds of intervention in processes 
of sociotechnical configuration. First, it dictates careful attention to the design of 
ostensibly ―technical‖ governance processes. Such processes should be designed in ways 




that make connections between the ―technical‖ and the ―political‖ more explicit. This 
process of gap-bridging requires more than merely translation if it is to be adequate. The 
obligation to promote human flourishing, and to create the conditions for the effective 
and active practice of citizenship, cannot be satisfied if information about technical 
governance processes flows only one way. The practice of citizenship requires both 
adequate representation in sociotechnical processes and input into the articulation of 
values to be instantiated in design. 
 Second, a critical-pragmatist approach to the practice of citizenship suggests the 
development of design principles intended to remind people that their actions and 
interactions are comprehensively mediated by their artifacts, and that alternative 
possibilities for both action and design exist. For example, if the current evolution of the 
blogosphere contributes to an echo chamber effect, a critical-pragmatist approach to 
governance would give consideration to how practical encounter with a diversity of 
viewpoints is to be achieved.
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 For example, one might imagine a set of mandates 
designed to achieve an ―architecture of discomfort‖ that would force people to encounter 
opposite points of view, or softer mandates designed to signal their availability and invite 
exploration. Other regulatory interventions might seek to encourage the design of social 
networking platforms in ways that remind users of the choices to be made, and that 
incorporate user feedback about the need for contextual separation. Interventions like 
these would serve as reminders that technical design is properly the subject of politics, 
and an important domain of ethical and moral choice. 
 
Conclusion 
 Networked information technologies and communications devices constitute a new 
regulatory landscape in which attention must be paid not simply to questions about what 
conduct is permitted or prohibited, but more generally and systemically to questions 
about the affordances that networked artifacts manifest and quality of the subjectivity that 
they produce. Those questions are neither technical nor of purely private concern, and to 
treat them that way is a mistake. Networked information technologies and 
communications devices already distribute responsibility for the configuration of 
networked citizens more broadly across a variety of network intermediaries. Regimes of 
sociotechnical configuration are a legitimate and urgent subject of public concern. 
 The unique combination of invisibility and restriction that characterizes many 
emerging networked information and communications technologies has powerful 
implications for human flourishing in the networked information society. There is no 
countervailing set of rules broadly distributing responsibility for promoting human 
flourishing and enabling the practice of citizenship, but there should be. Articulating such 
rules requires dissolving the liberty/efficiency binary, rejecting the presumptive 
privatization of ―governance,‖ and parsing more carefully the ways in which regulatory 
processes might allocate responsibility among a variety of actors. In particular, 
recognizing and responding to the problem of sociotechnical configuration requires a 




model of governance premised on the reassertion of ―public‖ values and the harnessing of 
resources and actors on both sides of the public-private divide in pursuit of important 
collective goals. A critical-pragmatist approach to the exercise of citizenship in the 
networked information society should seek to foster widespread awareness of the 
problem of configuration and to instill appreciation of the importance of continual, 
critical revision in the domain of the sociotechnical. 
 
Notes 
 Thanks to Lawrence Douglas, Austin Sarat, and Martha Merrill Umphrey for their helpful comments, 
and to June Casey and the staff of the Langdell Law Library at the Harvard Law School for research 
assistance. 
 1. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1998). 
 2. Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming January 2012). 
 3. See, for example, Steve Woolgar, ―Configuring the User,‖ in A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on 
Power, Technology and Domination, ed. John Law (New York: Routledge, 1991), 57–99. 
 4. See Brian Pfaffenberger, ―Social Anthropology of Technology,‖ 21(1) Annual Review of 
Anthropology (1992), 491–516. 
 5. See Peter-Paul Verbeek, What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and 
Design, trans. Robert P. Crease (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). 
 6. This example is adapted from Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, ch. 2. 
 7. See Tim Mak, ―Inside the Tea Party Echo Chamber,‖ Frum Forum, March 16, 2010, 
http://www.frumforum.com/frum-forum-surveys-the-tea-partiers; see also Kathleen Hall Jamieson and 
Joseph N. Cappella, Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008); and William Saletan, ―Bubble Think: How to Escape a Partisan 
Echo Chamber,‖ Slate, May 3, 2010. 
 8. Tarleton Gillespie, Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2007). 
 9. Langdon Winner, ―Do Artifacts Have Politics?‖ in The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits 
in an Age of High Technology, ed. Winner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
 10. On regimes of authorization, see Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, ch. 8. 
 11. Jodi Dean, Publicity’s Secret: How Technoculture Capitalizes on Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2002). 
 12. Irving Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, 
Crowding (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1975). 
 13. See Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, ―The Surveillant Assemblage,‖ 51(4) British 
Journal of Sociology (2000), 605–22. 
 14. Mari Matsuda, ―On Causation,‖ 100 Columbia Law Review (2000), 2195–2220. 
 15. Debates about causation and responsibility in the privacy context articulate the problem of 
configuration, if at all, in a way that is a function of privacy law’s concern with expectations. The problem 




with privacy claims, we are told, is that expectations can change—as though the patterns of change were 
themselves natural and organic rather than a function of artifactual design. 
 16. See, for example, Duncan Kennedy, ―The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,‖ 
130(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review (June 1982), 1349–57; and Karl Klare, ―The Public/Private 
Distinction in Labor Law,‖ 130(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review (June 1982), 1358–1422. 
 17. Michel Foucault, ―Governmentality,‖ in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. 
Graham Burtchaell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, rev. trans. Colin Gordon (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), 87–104. For a survey of the contemporary literature on governance, see Scott Burris, 
Michael Kempa, and Clifford Shearing, ―Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current 
Scholarship,‖ 41 Akron Law Review (2008), 1–66. 
 18. Danielle Keats Citron, ―Technological Due Process,‖ 85(6) Washington University Law Review 
(2008), 1249–1313. 
 19. Jody Freeman, ―The Private Role in Public Governance,‖ 74(3) New York University Law Review 
(2000), 543–675. 
 20. For a helpful summary, see Margaret Chon, ―Intellectual Property and the Development Divide,‖ 
27(6) Cardozo Law Review (April 2006), 2821–2912. 
 21. See, for example, Batya Friedman, ed., Human Values and the Design of Computer Technology 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 22. AnnJanette Rosga and Margaret L. Satterthwaite, ―The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human 
Rights,‖ 27(2) Berkeley Journal of International Law (2009), 253–315. 
 23. Jodi L. Short, ―The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform,‖ working paper (2010). 
 24. See, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, ―Aristotelian Social Democracy,‖ in Liberalism and the 
Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglass et al. (New York: Routledge, 1990), 203–52; Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: 
Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2006); Amartya Sen, Development 
as Freedom (New York: Anchor, 1999); Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992); and Sen, ―Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,‖ 32(4) Philosophy and Public Affairs 
(October 2004), 315–26. 
 25. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 76–78. 
 26. For a representative taxonomy, see Lea Bishop Shaver, ―Defining and Measuring A2K: A 
Blueprint for an Index of Access to Knowledge,‖ 4(2) I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information 
Society (Summer 2008), 235–69. 
 27. For a detailed discussion, see Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, ch. 9. 
 28. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, rev. ed. 1991). 
 29. Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2009). 
 30. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 273–324. 
 31. See, for example, John Law, ed., A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology, and 
Domination (New York: Routledge, 1991). 
 32. Larry Hickman, Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture: Putting Pragmatism to Work 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); Alison Kadlec, Dewey’s Critical Pragmatism (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2007). 
 33. See Jutta Treviranus and Stephen Hoekema, ―The Value of the Unpopular: Counteracting the 
Popularity Echo-Chamber on the Web,‖ IEEE TIC-STH 2009, 603–08. 
